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PEELING BACK THE ONION OF CYBER ESPIONAGE
AFTER TALLINN 2.0
COLONEL DAVID A. WALLACE, ∗ AMY H. MCCARTHY, ∗∗
LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK VISGER ∗∗∗
ABSTRACT
Tallinn 2.0 represents an important advancement in the understanding of international law’s application to cyber operations below the threshold of force. Its provisions on cyber espionage will
be instrumental to states in grappling with complex legal problems
in the area of digital spying. The law of cyber espionage as outlined by Tallinn 2.0, however, is substantially based on rules that
have evolved outside of the digital context, and there exist serious
ambiguities and limitations in its framework. This Article will explore gaps in the legal structure and consider future options available to states in light of this underlying mismatch.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber espionage is unquestionably one of the most persistent and perplexing economic and security problems in the world today. It has and will
continue to be a major source of friction between states into the foreseeable
future. 1 While many nations have suffered data breaches resulting in serious
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1. See, e.g., COLLIN ANDERSON & KARIM SADJADPOUR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L
PEACE, IRAN’S CYBER THREAT: ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, AND REVENGE 6 (2018), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iran_Cyber_Final_Full_v2.pdf (detailing Iran’s efforts in this arena); Tim
Johnson, Small Nations Join Hacking Game—and This Mideast One Got Big Results, MCCLATCHY
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ramifications from instances of digital espionage, most also quietly continue
to engage in cyber spying as an integral part of national security efforts. 2 The
interests of some states, however, are not limited to conventional political
and military secrets. Private entities have also emerged as important players
in this traditionally state-dominated activity. 3 Capabilities associated with
cyber technology have changed the landscape in trade secret and proprietary
data theft against states and private industry, creating serious financial perils
for victims and threats of national economic destabilization. 4
From the U.S. government perspective, cyber espionage has come to
represent not only a serious external national security and economic threat,
but a diplomatic and domestic public relations minefield. China has gained
substantial military advantages in recent years by stealing information on
some of the most advanced weapons systems in the American arsenal, including jet fighters and unmanned submersible vehicles. 5 In addition to the
exposure of military secrets, the theft of intellectual property has also posed
a threat to the country’s economic health and defense strategy. Commenting
on the impacts of economic cyber espionage specifically, a senior Department of Justice official in the Obama Administration observed:
This is a serious threat to our national security. I mean, our economy depends on the ability to innovate. And if there’s a dedicated
nation state who’s using its intelligence apparatus to steal day in

DC BUREAU (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/nationalsecurity/article196090329.html (describing a long-term cyber espionage campaign by Lebanon
against companies and individuals from twenty-one countries); Mariarosaria Taddeo, Opinion, Qatar Crisis: Lessons to Learn in the Age of Cyber Attacks, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/qatar-crisis-lessons-learn-age-cyber-attacks-640446 (citing the hack of
the Qatar News Agency and resulting friction between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, among
other recent instances).
2. See Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach,
19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1091, 1096–98 (2004); see also Seymour M. Hersh, The Online Threat:
Should We Be Worried About a Cyber War?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 1, 2010),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/01/the-online-threat (describing the “EP-3E” incident as an example of China’s interest and capability in the area of cyber espionage).
3. See Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L.
291, 293 (2015) (discussing the rise of foreign surveillance on individuals); see also Johan Sigholm,
Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations, 4 J. MIL. STUD. 1 (2013) (exploring the expanding role
of non-state actors in offensive cyber activities).
4. See Catherine Lotrionte, Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage Under
International Law, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 443, 459–73 (2014). Domestic corporate victims of cyber espionage include Coca-Cola, Lockheed Martin, Adobe, Google, and many others.
Id. at 454.
5. U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM’N, 114TH CONG., ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS
302 (2016), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2016%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.
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and day out what we’re trying to develop, that poses a serious
threat to our country. 6
In 2015, the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) was the subject
of a cyber-espionage operation by Chinese hackers 7 resulting in the release
of the personal information of over twenty-two million people. 8 In another
troubling and highly-publicized episode, a team with links to the Russian
government hacked into the Democratic National Committee computer system in an effort to disrupt the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 9 Reports of
America’s own program of surveillance have also created ripples around the
globe. Working for an intelligence contractor, Edward Snowden copied and
then leaked highly classified National Security Agency (“NSA”) information
that revealed, among other things, various intrusive cyber espionage activities by the United States and its allies. 10
Despite an increased global awareness of the dangers of digital spying,
international law currently does little to specifically address the practice.11
In the absence of specific treaty provisions, international law is generally reactive—reflecting state practice that over time hardens into customary law.
It is not surprising, then, that the international legal framework lags behind
the pace of change in cyberspace. The governing legal framework for digital
spying, in fact, evolved in the absence of modern digital capabilities. With
cyber espionage showing no sign of abating, it is important to not only understand the current state of international law, the lex lata, regarding digital
espionage, but also to recognize the gaps, ambiguities, and limitations in the

6. James Billington, China’s ‘Great Brain Robbery’ Hacking of U.S. Companies a National
Security Emergency, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/chinas-greatbrain-robbery-hacking-us-companies-national-security-emergency-1538590.
7. Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Government Has Arrested Hackers It Says Breached OPM Database, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-government-has-arrested-hackers-suspected-of-breaching-opm-database/2015/12/02/0295b918-990c-11e5-8917653b65c809eb_story.html?utm_term=.03db1e4a7150. It was unclear what, if any, relationship the
hackers had to the Chinese government. Id.
8. Kevin Murnane, Cyber Security: The World’s Best and Worst Presented with a Well-De(May
4,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevsigned
Infographic,
FORBES
inmurnane/2017/05/04/cyber-security-the-worlds-best-and-worst-presented-with-a-well-designedinfographic/#322335554416.
9. Eric Lipton et al., The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-electiondnc.html.
10. Paul Szoldra, This Is Everything Edward Snowden Revealed in One Year of Unprecedented
Top-Secret Leaks, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-leakstimeline-2016-9. Snowden’s disclosures resulted in international as well as domestic condemnation
of the United States’ cyber activities. See, e.g., The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, SPIEGEL (Oct.
27, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkelcell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html.
11. See infra Parts III, IV.
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current legal architecture. Also important is a consideration of the road
ahead, the lex ferenda, as the law evolves to fit this new digital context.
Fortunately for government and military officials, policy makers, legal
advisers, academics, and others interested in cyber law and policy, the 2017
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 12 (“Tallinn Manual 2.0” or “Tallinn 2.0”) is a foundational starting
point for such an analysis. Tallinn Manual 2.0 addresses several controversial legal matters surrounding cyber espionage as well as many other vital
issues spanning public international law. By way of background and context,
in 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (“NATO CCD COE”), a renowned cyber research and
training institution in Tallinn, Estonia, invited an independent group of experts to compile a manual on the international law governing cyber warfare. 13
This effort brought together a group of international law scholars and practitioners—the International Group of Experts (“Experts”)—to explore and articulate how extant legal norms apply to cyber warfare. 14 The original Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 15 was
published in 2013. As a result of the success of the first Tallinn Manual, the
NATO CCD COE launched a follow-on initiative to expand the scope of
coverage, with the updated Manual to include international law governing
cyber operations during peacetime. The reason for the new initiative by the
NATO CCD COE was to respond to the realities of what was actually happening in cyberspace. That is, states were dealing with cyber issues below
the use of force threshold on a frequent basis. 16
The NATO CCD COE thus convened a second group of Experts, and
their efforts led to the publication of Tallinn Manual 2.0 in 2017. The greatly
expanded Manual not only incorporates and updates the materials on cyber
warfare from the first publication, but also includes coverage of legal regimes
implicated by peacetime cyber activities. 17 Tallinn Manual 2.0 contains 154

12. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN 2.0].
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id.
15. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
16. See Tallinn Manual 2.0, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE,
https://ccdcoe.org/research/tallinn-manual/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
17. Id. Recent scholarship has explored Tallinn 2.0’s impact on areas involving sovereignty,
state attribution, and international human rights law. See generally William Banks, State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions After Tallinn 2.0, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1493 (2017);
Robert E. Barnsby & Shane R. Reeves, Give Them an Inch, They’ll Take a Terabyte: How States
May Interpret Tallinn Manual 2.0’s International Human Rights Law Chapter, 95 TEX. L. REV.
1515, 1516 (2017); Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95
TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1640–41 (2017). Not surprisingly, Tallinn 2.0 has generated a great deal of
discussion and debate and, in some cases, disagreement about how international legal norms apply
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rules, including two specific rules on cyber espionage—one for peacetime
and the other for armed conflict. 18 These rules reflect the Experts’ determinations as to the current lex lata within the area of cyber operations. The
commentary accompanying each rule not only provides some valuable insights into the deliberations of the Experts in terms of the legal basis for the
rules and their normative context, but also offers practical implications of
their application in a cyber environment. 19 Additionally, the commentaries
to the rules articulate, in some depth, the various positions taken by the Experts in their discussions, including the relative consensus they could reach
on a particular issue. This is helpful “[a]s neither treaty application nor [s]tate
practice is well developed” with respect to cyber operations generally, or
cyber espionage specifically. 20
This Article will examine the legal landscape of cyber espionage under
international law as delineated by Tallinn 2.0. First, the Article will explore
the historical and legal evolution of digital spying. 21 The Article will then
examine Tallinn 2.0’s specific rules pertaining to the practice. 22 Next, the
Article will discuss the normative gaps, ambiguities, and limitations of the
current state of the law, including an exploration of the international legal
norms that directly and indirectly govern cyber espionage. 23 Finally, the Article will offer some thoughts on the lex ferenda for cyber espionage, both in
peace and wartime, in light of current developments. 24 Significantly, the Article will evaluate whether the applicable international legal norms are adequate to regulate the pervasive and detrimental problem of digital spying for
states and, by extension, commercial interests, and individuals.
II. CYBER ESPIONAGE: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND CHARACTERISTICS
Espionage has a multitude of definitions. Popularly, it is defined as “the
practice of spying or using spies to obtain information about the plans and

to cyberspace and operations. Compare Gary Corn, Tallinn Manual 2.0—Advancing the Conversation, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37812/tallinn-manual-2-0-advancing-conversation/#more-37812 (adopting the opinion that sovereignty is a foundational principle for the international norms on the prohibition on the use of force and the rule of nonintervention), with Eric Talbot Jensen, The Tallinn Manual 2.0: Highlights and Insights, 48 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 735, 740–41 (2017) (positing that “sovereignty is a principle that depends on the domain
and the practical imperatives of states and is subject to adjustment in interstate application”). This
Article will focus exclusively on Tallinn 2.0’s treatment of cyber espionage.
18. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 168–74 (Rule 32), 409–12 (Rule 89).
19. See, e.g., id at 11–29 (discussing the issue of state sovereignty in the context of cyber operations).
20. Id. at 4.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
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activities especially of a foreign government or a competing company.” 25 Put
in a slightly different context, espionage includes, among other things, a
state’s efforts to clandestinely acquire classified or otherwise protected information from a targeted state or from entities or individuals within the targeted
state. 26 If knowledge is power, it is hardly surprising that states seek to obtain
intelligence from and about each other. In the most traditional sense of spying, a state or one of its organs dispatches an agent into another state on a
mission to access and obtain protected intelligence. 27
A. Historical Evolution
Espionage, for whatever purpose, is not new. Some have even said it is
the world’s second oldest profession. 28 Antiquity is replete with stories of
spies. The earliest known surviving record of espionage dates from the war
between Pharaoh Ramses with the Hittites and the Battle of Kadesh in 1274
B.C. 29 The tools of the spy trade have undergone a staggering transformation
over the course of human history. As technology has developed and progressed, astoundingly complex and creative means for carrying out espionage
have been devised. 30 For example, around 500 B.C., the Spartans invented
the skytale, a device composed of rods and papyrus designed to transport
hidden messages. 31 In the Middle Ages, the Italian painter and polymath
Leon Battista Alberti invented one of the first known mechanical devices for
encoding messages—a cipher wheel. 32 A more sophisticated version of Alberti’s cipher wheel was still being used during the American Civil War. 33

25. Espionage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/espionage (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
26. David P. Fidler, Economic Cyber Espionage and International Law: Controversies Involving Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets through Cyber Technologies, 17 ASIL INSIGHTS
(2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/10/economic-cyber-espionage-and-international-law-controversies-involving.
27. Russell Buchan, The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage,
in INTERNATIONAL CYBER NORMS: LEGAL, POLICY & INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES 65–66 (Anna Maria Osula & Henry Rõigas eds., 2016).
28. Paul Reynolds, The World’s Second Oldest Profession, BBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3490120.stm.
29. Steven M. Kleinman, The Promise of Interrogation v. The Problem of Torture, 43 VAL. U.
L. REV. 1577, 1579 (2009).
30. Leah Hoffmann, The Evolution of Spy Tools, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2006),
https://www.forbes.com/2006/04/15/intelligence-spying-gadgets_cx_lh_06slate_0418tools.html.
31. More descriptively:
Skytales were long, slender rods which had been wrapped with a thin strip of papyrus,
leather, or parchment. A message was written on the wrapping, and then the strip was
unwound and passed on to a messenger (who often wore it as a belt). Only when it was
rewound around a rod of the same diameter could the original message be deciphered.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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The 20th Century also saw some interesting gadgets used for spying.
For example, during World War I, the German military used pigeons outfitted
with cameras to photograph troops and fortifications. 34 Upon return, intelligence officers then studied the aerial photos to gain information about enemy
troop numbers, locations, and weapons. 35 The photographs also facilitated
the creation of more precise topographical maps. 36 During World War II,
brilliant allied mathematicians and engineers constructed a device that enabled intelligence officers to break the codes of the sophisticated German Lorenz SZ-40 cipher machine. 37 Nicknamed “Colossus,” it is now considered
the world’s first fixed-program, digital, electronic, computer. 38
In the aftermath of World War II, during the cloak and dagger drama of
the Cold War, states leveraged technological innovations to further their espionage efforts. These advancements include everything from miniaturized
cameras and shoe heel transmitters to high altitude U-2 spy planes, such as
the one flown by Francis Gary Powers when he was shot down by the Soviet
Union in 1960. 39
In more recent years, technology has transformed and revolutionized
methods of espionage. An explosion of technological advancements has led
to the development of such platforms and capabilities as unmanned surveillance drones, highly sophisticated and classified spy satellites and, of course,
computers, related information technology, and data-gathering techniques.
In one of the earliest cases of cyber espionage, West German officials discovered a Soviet-backed spy ring had gained access to dozens of U.S. military computers during the late 1980s. 40 Incidents of cyber espionage have
risen exponentially along with the ubiquitous use of computer technology. 41

34. Dan Schlenoff, Aerial Spying, 100 Years Before Drones, SCI. AM.: ANECDOTES FROM THE
ARCHIVE (Oct. 10, 2014), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anecdotes-from-the-archive/aerialspying-100-years-before-drones/.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Colossus, CRYPTO MUSEUM, http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/colossus/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
38. Id.
39. Michael Dobbs, Gary Powers Kept a Secret Diary with Him After He Was Captured by the
Soviets, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/gary-powers-secret-diary-soviet-capture-180956939/. Powers was sentenced to ten years in
prison by Russia for his admitted espionage but was released early in a prisoner exchange. A Look
Back. . . The Cold War: Strangers on a Bridge, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Feb. 20, 2009),
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/strangers-on-a-bridge.html.
40. John Markoff, West Germans Raid Spy Ring That Violated U.S. Computers, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/03/world/west-germans-raid-spy-ring-that-violated-us-computers.html.
41. For a comprehensive examination of the extent of foreign economic espionage occurring
in recent years with the aid of computer technology, see generally NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AND
SEC. CTR., FOREIGN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN CYBERSPACE
(2018),
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/news/20180724-economic-espionage-pub.pdf.
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Today, disturbing accounts of widespread cyber espionage activities,
such as exfiltration, monitoring, and theft of digital information, dominate
media reports. 42 No longer limited by geographical barriers, risk of capture,
and lack of linguistic and cultural expertise, modern cyber spies operate on a
dramatically different landscape than traditional spies. This shift has also
opened the playing field to smaller states previously excluded from largescale intelligence activities, traditionally dominated by major world powers. 43 For example, recent reports reveal the serious threat posed by North
Korean-linked cyber spies against multiple countries including the United
States, South Korea, and various Middle Eastern nations. 44
B. The Rise of Economic Espionage
State espionage has not been limited to the collection of military, political, or national security secrets. A historical analysis shows that nations
have also engaged in widespread economic-based surveillance of foreign
states and businesses—stealing trade secrets, intellectual property, and other
proprietary data for the benefit of governments and private firms since at least
the Cold War. 45 Economic espionage, sometimes also termed industrial or
commercial espionage, has resulted in unfair business advantages for nations
conducting these activities and enormous economic losses for state, institutional, and individual victims. 46
42. See, e.g., Ryan Lucas, U.S. Charges Alleged Chinese Government Spy with Stealing U.S.
Trade Secrets, NPR (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/10/656280811/u-s-charges-alleged-chinese-government-spy-with-stealing-u-s-trade-secrets (reporting on the charges filed
against a Chinese intelligence officer for economic espionage); Bruce Schneier, What’s Next in
Government Surveillance, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/whats-next-in-government-surveillance/385667/ (chronicling some modern instances of state-sponsored hacking, exfiltration, and espionage).
43. See Mark Galeotti, Size Doesn’t Matter for Spies Anymore, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 31,
2018), http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/31/size-doesnt-matter-for-spies-anymore/ (discussing the
robust espionage capabilities of Dutch spies, specifically).
44. See Eric Auchard, Lesser-Known North Korea Cyber-Spy Group Goes International: Report, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-cyber/lesser-knownnorth-korea-cyber-spy-group-goes-international-report-idUSKCN1G42CH.
45. See Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 444, 459–70 (explaining the dramatic rise in economic espionage as nations came to appreciate the significant role of financial stability in the maintenance
of national power in the aftermath of the USSR’s dissolution).
46. See id. (discussing the impact of economic espionage from the Cold War to modern day).
Economic espionage has been defined in various ways. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Economic espionage is foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons, designed
to unlawfully or clandestinely influence sensitive economic policy decisions or to unlawfully obtain sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy information; proprietary economic information; or critical technologies. This theft, through open and clandestine
methods, can provide foreign entities with vital proprietary economic information at a
fraction of the true cost of its research and development, causing significant economic
losses.
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The United States has publicly refused to take part in intelligence gathering for the benefit of private businesses since the 1970s. 47 In the wake of
the Edward Snowden revelations, the White House reaffirmed its commitment to this principle. 48 Based on statements from former government officials within the past few years, the U.S. position on economic espionage appears to be relatively unique. 49 The French government, for example, has
been breaking into hotel rooms of foreign business travelers and downloading the contents of their personal computers for the competitive advantage of
French companies for years. 50 Although the American government has consistently affirmed that it does not conduct commercial espionage to benefit
domestic companies, it is important to note that it does not deny that it collects economic information for its own use. 51

What
Is
“Economic
Espionage”?,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-economic-espionage (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
47. Samuel J. Rascoff, The Norm Against Economic Espionage for the Benefit of Private
Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 252 (2016). The President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) under President Nixon was of the opinion that such sharing
of information would be inappropriate and a conflict of interest. Id. (first citing JOHN J. FIALKA,
WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 7 (1997); then citing The Threat of
Foreign Economic Espionage to U. S. Corporations: Hearings Before the Subcom. on Economic
and Commercial Law of the H. Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 18 (1992) (statement of
Gerard S. Burke)).
48. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities. According to this directive:
The collection of foreign private commercial information or trade secrets is authorized
only to protect the national security of the United States or its partners and allies. It is
not an authorized foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose to collect such information to afford a competitive advantage to U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors
commercially.
Id. (footnote omitted). Some limited exceptions do apply, however. The government may share
specific information with a private firm, for example, indicating that the business is the victim of an
offensive cyber operation. See Rascoff, supra note 47, at 257. Additionally, information regarding
the involvement of foreign officials with suspect business transactions, including instances of bribery, may be conveyed to firms. Id.
49. Former CIA director Michael Hayden claimed that only four other countries followed
this American norm. Michael Hayden Says U.S. Is Easy Prey for Hackers; Former CIA and NSA
Chief Says ‘Shame on Us’ For Not Protecting Critical Information Better, WALL ST. J. (June 21,
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-hayden-says-u-s-is-easy-prey-for-hackers1434924058. This short list is most likely comprised of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand. Rascoff, supra note 47, at 256 & n.45 (citing Margaret Warner, An Exclusive
Club: The Five Countries That Don’t Spy on Each Other, PBS (Oct. 25, 2013),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/an-exclusive-club-the-five-countries-that-dont-spy-on-eachother).
50. Philip Ewing, Gates: French Cyber Spies Target U.S., POLITICO (May 22, 2014),
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/france-intellectual-property-theft-107020.
51. See Jack Goldsmith, The Precise (and Narrow) Limits on U.S. Economic Espionage,
LAWFARE (Mar. 23, 2015, 7:09 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/precise-and-narrow-limits-useconomic-espionage (positing that U.S. practice does allow for economic espionage on foreign
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Despite its own position, the United States has suffered the impacts of
foreign economic espionage from a variety of governments over time, involving South Korea, Japan, France, Russia, Israel, China, and Germany. 52 China
is a notable example. Chinese economic espionage is on an almost unfathomable industrial scale. Although exact figures are unknowable, the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated that the
theft of American intellectual property totals approximately $300 billion annually, with fifty to eighty percent of that resulting from China. 53 China’s
long-running campaign to steal valuable information and data from companies and government agencies includes the work of at least one unit from the
People’s Liberation Army—Unit 61398—as well as other highly effective
government-sponsored cyber espionage organizations. 54 In his statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 11, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, stated that Beijing would likely
continue to actively target the U.S. government, its allies, and American companies with cyber espionage operations. 55
The intersection of the advancement of cyber capabilities and concurrent rise in economic espionage is particularly significant. As described by
retired U.S. Army General Keith Alexander, the former Director of the NSA
and the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, “The loss of industrial information and intellectual property through cyber espionage constitutes the
‘greatest transfer of wealth in history.’” 56 Problematically for most states,
national governments generally lack control over the private digital networks
and infrastructure subject to foreign economic espionage efforts. 57 This has
states and companies, and even theft of trade secrets, but does not allow the information to be passed
along to U.S. firms).
52. Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 468 (citing JOHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS:
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 5 (1997)).
53. Adam Segal, How China Is Preparing for Cyberwar, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 20,
2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2017/0320/How-China-ispreparing-for-cyberwar.
54. Ellen Nakashima & Ashkan Soltani, FBI Warns Industry of Chinese Cyber Campaign,
WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-warnsindustry-of-chinese-cyber-campaign/2014/10/15/0349a00a-54b0-11e4-ba4bf6333e2c0453_story.html?utm_term=.3a4eb16c5ed4.
55. Worldwide Threats: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 6–
7 (2018) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence).
56. Randolph Kahn, Economic Espionage in 2017 and Beyond: 10 Shocking Ways They Are
Stealing Your Intellectual Property and Corporate Mojo, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/05/05_kahn/.
57. In addition to maintaining security over Department of Defense networks, one of the interests of U.S. Cyber Command is coordinating with the private sector in ensuring digital security. See
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD CYBER STRATEGY 7 (2015), http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/final_2015_dod_cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf. The report also
stated, “The United States government has a limited and specific role to play in defending the nation
against cyberattacks of significant consequence. The private sector owns and operates over ninety
percent of all of the networks and infrastructure of cyberspace and is thus the first line of defense.”
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been exacerbated further with the rise of cloud computing. 58 Where nations
have historically maintained control over domestic borders and pertinent
governmental assets, thereby mitigating the risk of traditional forms of intelligence gathering, this balance of control has been upset in the industrial
cyber realm.
C. Methods and Characteristics of Cyber Espionage
As discussed below, the method used to accomplish an act of espionage
is determinative in any legal analysis. 59 It is important, therefore, to briefly
consider the varieties and characteristics of digital espionage operations. As
a starting point, most acts of cyber spying could be fairly characterized as
computer network “exploitation” rather than as an “attack,” as the aim is the
collection of information rather than the destruction or degradation of digital
capabilities. 60 Cyber espionage is one type of cyber intrusion. A helpful description of cyber espionage is contained in the NATO volume Peacetime
Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. It provides:
[C]opying of data that is publicly not available and which is in
wireless transmission, saved or temporarily available on ITsystems or computer networks located on the territory or area under the exclusive jurisdiction of another [s]tate by a [s]tate organ,
agent, or otherwise attributable to a [s]tate, conducted secretly, under disguise or false pretences, and without the (presumed) consent
or approval of the owners or operators of the targeted IT-systems
or computer networks or of the territorial [s]tate. Copying includes
also the temporary copying of data into the random access or virtual memory of an IT-system for the purpose of mere visualization
or acoustic exemplification of ([for example], voice over IP) data. 61
In some important respects, cyber espionage is in a category by itself
with regard to its characteristics and capabilities. First, cyber espionage has
virtually unlimited reach given that a digital operation can be launched from
and target almost anywhere in the world. Second, with the development and

Id. at 5. U.S. Cyber Command considers national economic security as a major cyber concern for
the future. Id. at 2.
58. See J. Nicholas Hoover, Compliance in the Ether: Cloud Computing, Data Security and
Business Regulation, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 255, 260–62 (2013) (describing the security perils of
cloud computing).
59. See infra Part IV.
60. See HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 156 (2012);
see also Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 829 (2012).
61. Katharina Ziolkowski, Peacetime Cyber Espionage—New Tendencies in Public International Law, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY 429 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013).
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evolution of the “internet of things” in which all things in societies are connected via data networks, 62 cyber espionage poses broad risks to human infrastructure. Third, it is also extraordinarily difficult to defend against. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent by states, businesses, and
individuals on software, services, and hardware to prevent and mitigate the
effects of cyber espionage. 63 Emerging technologies facilitate access to voluminous information and the ability to download it at an incredible speed. 64
Finally, one of the true Gordian knots of cyber operations generally, and
cyber espionage specifically, is the difficulty of attribution. The attribution
of cyber activities carried out through the internet is extraordinarily problematic and, in many cases, impossible to achieve. 65 Given these capabilities and
characteristics of operating in cyberspace, it is no surprise that cyber espionage is a particularly attractive and effective method to acquire information.
Of course, it is axiomatic that technology, by its very nature, develops more
quickly than do most laws that regulate its use. This is certainly true with
international law and cyber espionage. In fact, cyber espionage poses significant challenges to the legal framework governing traditional espionage practices.
D. Traditional Legal Framework
As background, it is important to understand the legal status of traditional forms of espionage, both in times of peace and of conflict. As a threshold matter, the international legality of state conduct is articulated in the 1927
landmark Permanent Court of International Justice opinion in the Lotus
case. 66 According to that decision, states have significant discretion, limited
only in certain cases by prohibitive rules and, in the absence of such rules, a
62. See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’ FORBES (May 13,
2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-thingsthat-anyone-can-understand/#7d48b45f1d09.
63. David J. Kappos & Pamela Passman, Cyber Espionage Is Reaching Crisis Levels,
FORTUNE (Dec. 12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/12/cybersecruity-amsc-cyber-espionage/.
64. Consider the statement of a senior U.S. government source: “A spy might once have been
able to take out a few books’ worth of material . . . . Now they take the whole library. And if you
restock the shelves, they will steal it again.” Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST (July
1, 2010), https://www.economist.com/node/16478792.
65. See generally Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 229 (2012) (examining the issues endemic to cyber operation attribution).
66. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18–19 (Sept. 7). The
court held:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a [s]tate is
that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its
power in any form in the territory of another [s]tate. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly
territorial; it cannot be exercised by a [s]tate outside its territory except by virtue of a
permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.
Id.
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state is free to adopt the principles that it believes are best and most suitable
to its interests. 67
1. In Peacetime
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the legal status of traditional foreign
espionage during peacetime. International law is virtually silent on this issue. 68 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does grant immunity
to a foreign diplomatic official discovered to be involved in espionage activities. 69 Such person will generally be deemed a persona non grata70 and removed from the host state. 71 Aside from this limited circumstance, however,
significant legal ambiguity exists in the area of peacetime espionage. Although there is some disagreement in the literature, 72 the scholarly consensus
appears to be that the practice is either not illegal or it is affirmatively legal
under international law. 73 Simply put, no international treaty specifically
prohibits espionage, and there exists a long-established and widespread state
practice of employing spies. The lack of mutual agreements in this area is
not surprising, however. Nations have strong national security and political
justifications for spying. 74 States are understandably reluctant to reveal their
own capabilities and methods in foreign intelligence gathering, and bilateral
or multilateral discussions on this issue may necessitate disclosing such information. 75 Even if specific terms could be agreed upon, espionage is inev-

67. Buchan, supra note 27, at 67–68.
68. See A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28
MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 601–03 (2007). According to one scholar, “[T]raditional international law
is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime practice of espionage. Leading treatises overlook espionage altogether or contain a perfunctory paragraph that defines a spy and describes his hapless fate
upon capture.” Id. at 602 (alteration in original) (quoting Richard A. Falk, Foreward to ESSAYS ON
ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at v (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1962)).
69. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 31, ¶ 1, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95.
70. Literally, “unwelcome” or “unacceptable” person. See Ben Zimmer, “Persona non grata”:
The Diplomatic Way to Say ‘You’re Unwelcome, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/persona-non-grata-the-diplomatic-way-to-say-youre-unwelcome1483631639 (explaining this term in the context of diplomatic relations).
71. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 69, art. 9, ¶ 1; see Lotrionte, supra
note 4, at 460–61 (noting American and Russian instances of this practice from the Cold War).
72. Scholars have taken the varying views that peacetime espionage is legal, illegal, or in a
gray area between the two. Radsan, supra note 68, at 602–06.
73. See Ashley S. Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International
Law, 102 VA. L. REV. 599, 608 (2016); see also Darien Pun, Comment, Rethinking Espionage in
the Modern Era, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 360–61 (2017) (exploring the tolerability of this uncertainty in the modern day).
74. See, e.g., Arthur S. Hulnick & Daniel W. Mattausch, Ethics and Morality in United States
Secret Intelligence, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 515 (1989) (arguing that foreign intelligence
gathering fits within a state’s general obligation to protect citizens).
75. Deeks, supra note 3, at 314.
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itably cloaked in secrecy, and violations of such agreements would be difficult to detect. 76 In other words, states would lack adequate assurances that
legal agreements would be effective and domestically beneficial.
Despite the paucity of substantive prohibitions of espionage in international law, states themselves have long criminalized espionage under their
own domestic laws. 77 Foreign spies are subject to apprehension, prosecution,
and perhaps execution if discovered. 78 This arrangement creates a strange
legal duality: Although spying is criminally proscribed by domestic law if
conducted within and against the host country, the state itself engages in the
same practice with its own intelligence assets around the globe.79 This framework of risk is one that virtually all states are willing to accept. Indeed, almost every developed country in the world engages in foreign intelligence
gathering. 80 In a practical sense, spying during peacetime may be seen as a
responsible state tradition aimed at maintaining vital national interests and
curbing potential external threats. 81 Espionage may also serve to facilitate a
reduction in friction between states in international relations. 82 Nations have
been operating in these legally uncertain waters for many years. 83
2. During Conflict
In contrast to peacetime espionage, several treaty provisions govern the
international legal framework regarding spying during wartime. 84 The first
76. Id.
77. Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 461 (noting that although states may prosecute and imprison
spies under their own domestic law, it has been a frequent historical practice for states to exchange
captured spies with opposing states).
78. See the case of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg for example. Rosenberg v. United States, 346
U.S. 273 (1953). For a thorough exploration of that trial, see Atossa M. Alavi, The Government
Against Two: Ethel and Julius Rosenberg’s Trial, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1057 (2003).
79. See, e.g., Radsan, supra note 68, at 618–19.
80. Id. at 613.
81. Id.
82. Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 445.
83. See Deeks, supra note 3, at 313–15 (discussing the relative “agnosticism” of states in the
area of espionage under international law).
84. A condition precedent to the application of the law of armed conflict is, not surprisingly,
an armed conflict. The law of armed conflict classifies armed conflicts into two types, namely:
international and non-international armed conflicts. As a matter of law, no other type of armed
conflict exists. The criteria for an international armed conflict, which is derived from Common
Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, involves two or more sovereign states using armed force
against each other regardless of the reasons or the intensity of the confrontation. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85. Under the plain language
of Common Article 2, a declaration of war and an occupation, partial or total, can also trigger the
application of the entirety of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Id. art. 2. Conversely, non-international armed conflicts, as delineated by Common Article 3, are between governmental forces and
non-governmental armed groups, or between such groups only. Id. art. 3; see Int’l Comm. of the
Red Cross [ICRC], How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian
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treaty governing spies in wartime is Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and its annex, Regulations Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907)—the Hague Relations. 85 It has
three relevant articles:
ARTICLE 29.
A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely
or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention
of communicating it to the hostile party.
Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into
the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies. Similarly, the following are not considered spies: Soldiers and civilians, carrying
out their mission openly, intrusted with the delivery of despatches
intended either for their own army or for the enemy’s army. To
this class belong likewise persons sent in balloons for the purpose
of carrying despatches and, generally, of maintaining communications between the different parts of an army or a territory.
ARTICLE 30.
A spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous
trial.
ARTICLE 31.
A spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war,
and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage. 86
Importantly, the concept of espionage in the context of an armed conflict
only applies to international armed conflicts—those occurring between
states. 87 Taken together, and as supplemented and developed by Article 46
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, 88 these provisions not

Law?, at 1–2, Opinion Paper (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
85. Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague IV].
86. Id. art. 29–31.
87. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 410. This is because neither the concept of combatant
immunity nor the status of prisoner of war (as discussed below) pertains to non-international armed
conflicts. Id.
88. Article 46 reaffirms the traditional rules on espionage in the Hague Relations with some
variations. Article 46 provides:
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only define what it means for a member of the armed forces to engage in
espionage, but also consequences of such conduct during an armed conflict.
Article 31 of the Hague Relations is a unique and extraordinary provision in
several respects. 89 First, spying is a status issue, not a war crime. If a member
of the armed forces is captured while clandestinely engaging in the act of
spying in the zone of operations of a belligerent, they do not retain the privileges afforded to members of the armed forces and, instead, may be prosecuted and punished for spying. 90 Under Article 31, a spy can regain their
status as a prisoner of war (“POW”) and receive prosecutorial immunity if—
after escape from capture—they are able to rejoin their army. 91 By comparison, there exists no similar dispensation for civilians. 92 That is, the civilian
remains subject to trial and punishment under the domestic criminal laws of
the targeted state upon capture. Additionally, if a civilian engages in espionage during an armed conflict, they may be considered to be taking a direct
part in hostilities, thereby jeopardizing their protected status as a civilian under the law of armed conflict and making that person targetable during the
period of participation. 93

1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or of this Protocol, any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an adverse
Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war
and may be treated as a spy.
2. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party
and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information
shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform
of his armed forces.
3. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is a resident of territory
occupied by an adverse Party and who, on behalf of the Party on which he depends,
gathers or attempts to gather information of military value within that territory shall not
be considered as engaging in espionage unless he does so through an act of false pretences
or deliberately in a clandestine manner. Moreover, such a resident shall not lose his right
to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured while
engaging in espionage.
4. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is not a resident of territory
occupied by an adverse Party and who has engaged in espionage in that territory shall not
lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is
captured before he has rejoined the armed forces to which he belongs.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 46, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
89. Hague IV, supra note 85, art. 31.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 221 (2d ed. 2010).
93. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 410.
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As contemplated under international law, traditional forms of espionage
involve “acting clandestinely or on false pretences” in the context of employing human resources behind enemy lines. 94 It does not specifically address
espionage conducted by other intelligence-gathering methods, such as the use
of electronic devices, wiretapping, code breaking, and aerial or satellite photography. 95 To put a finer point on the concept of “acting clandestinely,” the
soldier must be engaged in activities undertaken secretly or secretively designed to conceal the identity of persons involved or the fact that it had occurred. 96 By contrast, “on false pretences” has been interpreted to mean that
certain conduct created the impression that the individual concerned was entitled to access the information in question. 97 The most commonly envisioned example of spying under the law of armed conflict is a member of the
armed forces captured in civilian clothing, or in an enemy uniform, gathering
intelligence behind enemy lines.98
The above provisions show that the international community may consider spying during wartime, like in peacetime, to be an accepted reality. Despite the fact that espionage does not constitute a war crime, it is still an activity that is commonly criminally proscribed by states. 99 A captured spy,
whether soldier or civilian, may be prosecuted by the detaining military for
violating an applicable law of the detaining force. 100
III. CYBER ESPIONAGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND TALLINN 2.0
Mirroring the legal framework addressed in the previous section, Tallinn Manual 2.0 also articulates two distinct rules covering cyber espionage—one for peacetime and the other for armed conflict.
A. In Peacetime
Under Rule 32 of Tallinn 2.0, peacetime cyber espionage is defined as
“any act undertaken clandestinely or under false pretences that uses cyber
94. See Hague IV, supra note 85, art. 29.
95. See id.
96. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 410.
97. Id.
98. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN WAR 240 (2d ed. 2016).
99. For a comprehensive list of state practices regarding captured spies during armed conflict,
see Practice Relating to Rule 107. Spies, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule107_sectionb (last visited Dec. 28, 2018).
100. In an early American example, British Major John Andre was sentenced to death by a U.S.
military commission after being apprehended behind enemy lines in civilian clothes following his
meeting with Benedict Arnold to arrange the defeat of West Point. See John Andre: Case Officer,
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (May 8, 2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/kent-csi/vol5no3/html/v05i3a07p_0001.htm. For a thorough review of espionage under American military law, see David A. Anderson, Spying in Violation of Article 106, UCMJ: The
Offense and the Constitutionality of its Mandatory Death Penalty, 127 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
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capabilities to gather, or attempt to gather, information.” 101 The Experts enumerated a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct or activities that potentially could involve cyber espionage: surveillance, monitoring, capturing, or
exfiltrating electronically transmitted or stored communications, data, or
other information. 102 Importantly, the Experts included within the term
“cyber espionage” actions that are directed at states and private businesses—
to specifically include industrial and economic espionage. 103 In terms of its
scope of applicability, Rule 32 is applied to states and those whose actions
can be attributed to states. 104
The Tallinn 2.0 Experts’ bottom line legal analysis for peacetime cyber
espionage is quite clear: “[P]eacetime cyber espionage by [s]tates does not
per se violate international law, [although] the method by which it is carried
out might do so.” 105 Once examined more closely, this conclusion is an unsurprising statement of existing law. In neither cyber espionage nor traditional forms of espionage in peacetime are there specific international treaties
that regulate this practice. 106 The Experts did acknowledge that because
cyber espionage has become so widespread and damaging, it has spurred a
debate about whether a new customary international law norm prohibiting
espionage has developed. 107 In fact, the Experts could point to several facts
which tended to indicate that such a norm might be developing. 108 Ultimately, however, the Experts concluded that there was insufficient state practice and opinio juris 109 to support the conclusion that a norm prohibiting
states from engaging in cyber espionage has emerged. 110
The Experts specifically left open the possibility that cyber espionage
might violate international law in the way that it is conducted, however. 111
They indicated that certain methods of cyber espionage may violate principles of international law—particularly sovereignty and the prohibition

101. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 168.
102. Id. The Experts were careful to caveat their definition and description of cyber espionage
in peacetime. More specifically, they cautioned that the term “cyber espionage” was proffered in
the Tallinn Manual for the purpose of Rule 32 and had no independent legal significance. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Buchan, supra note 27, at 68; see infra Part IV (discussing treaties which may be adapted
to this purpose).
107. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 169.
108. Id. at 169 nn.384 & 386. The Experts indicated a number of instances where states have
begun to ban the practice of cyber espionage among themselves. Id. at 169 n.386.
109. That is, a subjective belief on behalf of a state that a certain obligation need be followed.
See infra text accompanying note 265.
110. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 169.
111. Id. at 170.
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against intervention, which is discussed in the following sections. 112 In addition, the Experts were clear to note that stylizing a cyber operation as espionage does not, thereby, render an otherwise illegal operation legal. 113 In the
commentary to Rule 32, they emphasized:
[I]f an aspect of a cyber espionage operation is unlawful under international law, it renders the cyber espionage unlawful. By styling a cyber operation as a ‘cyber espionage operation’, a [s]tate
cannot therefore claim that it is by definition lawful under international law; its lawfulness depends on whether the way in which the
operation is carried out violates any international law obligations
that bind the [s]tate. 114
This construct creates a situation where the severity of damage caused
by the espionage does not determine the legality of the act. 115 Instead, the
legal analysis centers upon whether the method of cyber espionage violates
some other norm of international law. In other words, it does not matter that
a state purloined nuclear launch codes via cyber espionage, but if the spying
state damages or destroys a computer in the process, then that state has violated the sovereignty of the target state. 116 As another example, if a state uses
the premises of a diplomatic post to conduct cyber espionage, that state may
be in violation of international law—specifically the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. 117
B. During Conflict
The legal framework for cyber espionage in wartime, on the other hand,
relies on the adaptation of rules found in the Geneva Conventions and Hague
Relations. The espionage provisions found in these two marquee law of
armed conflict treaties reflect customary international law. 118 Not surprisingly, Tallinn 2.0 tracks these rules fairly closely. Tallinn 2.0 Rule 89 provides, “A member of the armed forces who has engaged in cyber espionage
in enemy-controlled territory loses the right to be a prisoner of war and may
be treated as a spy if captured before rejoining the armed forces to which

112. See infra Sections IV.A–B.
113. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 170.
114. Id.
115. On this point, a minority of the Experts did posit that cyber espionage that seriously undermined the security of a state, such as exfiltration of nuclear launch codes, might be sufficient to
violate sovereignty. Id. at 171. This was not the dominant position, however. Id.
116. Compare id. at 173 (noting that an operation which inadvertently damaged a computer in
the target state would violate that state’s sovereignty), with id. at 171 (noting that a majority of
experts opined that cyber espionage of another state’s nuclear launch codes would not per se violate
international law).
117. Id. at 227–29.
118. Id. at 410.
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[they] belong[].” 119 In other words, such an individual is not treated as a
member of the armed forces with associated POW treatment and immunity
from prosecution as a combatant.
As can be seen when compared with the relevant Geneva and Hague
provisions, this Rule is based on the law regarding traditional spying in wartime, which generally provides for immunity for a spy when the spy rejoins
the armed forces but otherwise allows a spy to be subject to prosecution under
domestic law if apprehended. 120 The Experts were clear that, as applied to
cyber espionage, “[t]his Rule is limited to situations in which the individual
concerned engages in cyber espionage while in ‘enemy controlled territory.’” 121 As a result, remote cyber operations are not subject to this Rule, as
such cyber operators are not operating behind enemy lines and, accordingly,
do not need to “rejoin” their armed force. This Rule would then have very
limited applicability to situations where a cyber operator was required to
clandestinely travel into enemy territory to conduct the necessary operation—such as intercepting signal communication or physical delivery of a
flash drive into an enemy system. 122
Much like peacetime cyber espionage, the Tallinn 2.0 Experts made
clear that cyber spying is not a per se violation of the law of armed conflict,
although it is subject to the body of law and may violate its provisions. 123
That is, the spy is neither a war criminal nor is the act of espionage a war
crime as in the case of traditional methods of spying. 124 Rule 89 merely concerns the classification of detained personnel. The collection of enemy intelligence during armed conflicts is a long-recognized method of warfare, and
this tradition applies equally to the cyber context. 125
IV. CYBER ESPIONAGE: NORMATIVE GAPS, AMBIGUITIES, AND
LIMITATIONS
An examination of Tallinn 2.0’s treatment of cyber espionage reveals
certain normative gaps, ambiguities, and limitations in the application of customary law to digital spying. The struggle to fit cyber espionage into traditional legal underpinnings is evident even from Tallinn 2.0’s foundational
parameters. Regarding peacetime espionage, for example, the Experts noted

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 409.
Id. at 411; see supra notes 86, 88 and accompanying text.
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 411.
Id.
Id.
LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 145 (3d. ed. 2008);
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 169.
125. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 169.
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that cyber espionage can be facilitated in each of the three layers of cyberspace: physical, logical, and social. 126 The physical layer includes the physical network components, such as hardware, cables, routers, servers, and so
on. The logical layer includes the connections between networked devices.
Finally, the social layer includes all of the individuals and groups that are
involved in cyber activities who are susceptible to social engineering attacks. 127 These descriptions used to define modes of cyber espionage in Tallinn 2.0 serve to underscore the differences between prototypical cyber espionage and traditional espionage. 128 In both, the critical work to conduct the
cyber espionage can be completed without stepping foot in the targeted country. While one can conceive of some instances of espionage that may require
physical presence, most do not and a prudent cyber spy would take care to
avoid such a scenario. 129 Further limitations in Tallinn 2.0’s statement of the
law become clear when considering the application of existing international
legal limits on state behavior.
After examining the current state of international law, the Tallinn 2.0
Experts concluded that espionage, in peacetime or wartime, does not per se
violate international law. 130 That is, the fact that an operation is cyber espionage does not render the operation illegal, but the way in which the operation is carried out may render it unlawful. Tallinn 2.0 describes specific violations of international law that may be applicable to peacetime cyber
espionage operations. 131 As will be seen, the doctrines of sovereignty, nonintervention, and protection of privacy may provide some substantive, albeit
imprecisely defined, legal restrictions on state conduct in this field. The issues of non-state actors and the state duty of due diligence, as well as the
specific issue of weaponized honeypots, also constitute important legal considerations.
A. State Sovereignty
In the case of peacetime espionage, the most likely international legal
provision to be implicated is that of sovereignty. A cornerstone of international law, this precept protects nations from unwanted intrusions by foreign
states. 132 The protection of sovereignty is noted in Rule 4 of Tallinn 2.0,

126. Id. at 168–69.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 169–70.
129. In fact, the five Chinese officers recently indicted by the United States for hacking American companies all allegedly conducted their criminal acts while sitting at a workstation in Beijing.
See infra notes 249–251 and accompanying text.
130. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 410.
131. Id. at 170–71.
132. Speaking to the foundational importance of sovereignty in international law, scholar Russell Buchan observed,
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which provides: “A [s]tate must not conduct cyber operations that violate the
sovereignty of another [s]tate.” 133 The Tallinn 2.0 Experts did not precisely
delineate when a cyber operation would constitute a violation of sovereignty.
At a minimum, a violation of sovereignty would occur “when one [s]tate’s
cyber operation interferes with or usurps the inherently governmental functions of another [s]tate.” 134 In addition, sufficient “infringement upon the
target [s]tate’s territorial integrity” 135 would also qualify. While the degree
necessary to constitute a sufficient infringement upon territorial integrity was
not specified, the Experts identified three levels of possible infringement:
“(1) physical damage; (2) loss of functionality; and (3) infringement upon
territorial integrity falling below the threshold of loss of functionality.” 136
One type of cyber espionage operation that might implicate sovereignty
is the operation that physically takes place in the sovereign territory of the
target nation. The Experts were divided on whether such an operation violated sovereignty, but the majority believed that it did in fact violate the precept. 137 For example, in a cyber espionage operation by an agent of one state
that is physically present in the targeted state, the majority of Experts were
of the view that such conduct would violate the principle of sovereignty. 138
The rationale is that if agents of one state are physically present in another
state’s territory and conduct cyber operations without consent or other legal
justification, the targeted state’s sovereignty has been violated by the former
state. 139 The minority, however, took the position that “extensive [s]tate
practice of conducting espionage on [a] target [s]tate’s territory has created
an exception to the generally accepted [view] that non-consensual activities
attributable to a [s]tate while physically present on another[] [state’s] territory

The principle of state sovereignty is often regarded as a constitutional norm of international law and is the basis ‘upon which the whole of international law rests.’ However,
‘[s]overeignty has different aspects’ and in order to protect the different features of state
sovereignty the international community has developed various principles of international law. These include the principle of territorial sovereignty, which protects the territory of a state from external intrusion; the principle of non-intervention, which protects
the political integrity of a state from coercion; the prohibition against the use of force,
which protects states against the use of violence, and where the use of violence is of
sufficient scale and effects international law casts such conduct as an armed attack entitling the victim state to use force in self-defence.
Buchan, supra note 27, at 68 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14,
¶ 263 (June 27); then quoting OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 382 (Robert Jennings & Adam
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996)).
133. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 17.
134. Id. at 21.
135. Id. at 20.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 19–20.
138. Id. at 19.
139. Id.
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violate[s] sovereignty.” 140 Interestingly, the majority’s view indicates that
they would consider most traditional methods of espionage to be violations
of the doctrine of sovereignty, as they tended to occur within the territorial
jurisdiction of the victim state.141
The more relevant and pressing issue of remote cyber espionage similarly caused cognitive dissonance for the Experts. They could not achieve
consensus on the issue of whether remote cyber espionage could reach a particular threshold of severity and, thereby, violate the sovereignty of the targeted state. 142 In a hypothetical provided by the Experts, a state remotely
accesses another state’s military or intelligence cyber systems and exfiltrates
significant amounts of highly classified data over an extended period of
time. 143 The majority of Experts believed that the exfiltration did not violate
the targeted state’s sovereignty and, what is more, the legal issue was not one
of severity but of the method employed. 144 Interestingly, a few of the Experts
were of the opinion that if the consequences suffered by the cyber espionage
were so severe—if large amounts of classified data were exfiltrated over a
long period, for example—it would amount to a violation of sovereignty regardless of the method used. 145 Under this sovereignty approach, important
factors would include whether computer systems were damaged or destroyed—not the nature, quality, or quantity of information purloined. 146
On the other hand, if a remote cyber espionage operation results in a
loss of functionality within a state’s digital infrastructure, the Experts agreed
that it may constitute a violation of that state’s sovereignty. 147 This is true
regardless of whether the infrastructure is owned by the country itself or private industry. 148 This finding is in line, generally, with Tallinn 2.0’s guidelines regarding sovereignty in the context of any type of cyber operation. 149

140. Id. There are significant pitfalls to such an approach, particularly the danger that such an
exception would swallow Rule 4 and undermine the entire concept of sovereignty. Perhaps anticipating such an objection, the minority stressed that this exception is narrow and limited to espionage. Id.
141. The literature on this issue does not seem to strongly support the majority view. See supra
notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
142. TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 170.
143. Id. at 170–71.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 171.
146. This understanding would give small consolation to states who have suffered massive data
losses due to foreign hacking.
147. Id. at 170.
148. Id. at 14.
149. See id. at 20–21 (stating that “the remote causation of loss of functionality of cyber infrastructure located in another [s]tate sometimes constitutes a violation of sovereignty”).

228

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:205

It remains unclear, however, the exact threshold needed to constitute a violation of sovereignty in this way. 150 According to the Experts, a cyber operation that necessitates repair to physical components of the digital infrastructure amounts to a violation. 151 However, no consensus was reached as to
whether a breach of sovereignty has occurred when an operation merely necessitates reinstallation of a computer operating system, for example. 152 Further, the Experts could not reach a consensus on cyber espionage operations
that install “backdoors” to access data, cause cyber programs to operate in a
different manner, or activities which alter or delete data stored within the
cyber infrastructure. 153 Legal nuances surrounding the effects of various
means of digital espionage remain uncertain.
B. Non-Intervention
In addition to sovereignty, customary international law also establishes
the principle of non-intervention—that is, a state must not interfere in the
affairs of another state.154 Violation of this principle requires the offending
state, or individual acting at the behest of that state, to act coercively in the
internal or external affairs of the victim state. 155 The Experts paid considerable attention to the issue of state non-intervention in regards to cyber operations. 156 For the specific issue of cyber espionage, they were of the opinion
that it does not qualify per se as intervention, as it is not necessarily coercive
in nature. 157 However, certain activities within the realm of cyber espionage
may rise to the level of state intervention. For example, the majority of Experts posited that in the event one state gained access to another state’s government computer system, accessed sensitive domestic intelligence data, and
then made such records public, that activity could constitute unlawful intervention if the goal was to alter an internal political debate over the victim
state’s surveillance practices. 158 On the other hand, mere intrusion into a foreign nation’s cyber infrastructure, which necessitates breaching cyber barriers—including overcoming firewalls or password protection—would be inadequate to qualify as intervention. 159
Unfortunately, Tallinn 2.0 gives little attention to the possibility of economically-oriented espionage, including theft of trade secrets and intellectual
150. Id. at 21.
151. Id.
152. See id. (noting that an intrusive cyber activity that merely required a “reboot” would probably not qualify as a violation of sovereignty).
153. Id. at 21.
154. Id. at 312.
155. Id. at 314.
156. Id. at 323.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 320.
159. Id. at 323.
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property, which may rise to the level of intervention. 160 Indeed, it is likely
that economic and industrial espionage pose a particularly vexing problem in
terms of intervention, as these activities are likely to financially disadvantage
the victim state and ultimately impact that state’s economic and trade policies. 161 Significant ambiguity persists regarding this issue.
C. Non-State Actors and Due Diligence
The legal category of “espionage” presupposes conduct by a state agent
or a person acting under the direction of a state. The theft of government or
industry secrets by individuals acting in a private capacity is just that: theft.
Likewise, non-state actors hacking into foreign government or corporate network does not constitute espionage, but it is commonly proscribed by domestic law. 162 The international law precept of due diligence, however, requires
states to ensure that their own territory and other objects163 over which they
have control are not used in a way that harms other states. 164 Does this principle require states, in the absence of a treaty agreement on point, to end the
digital theft by domestic non-state actors when their conduct harms foreign
nations? In the view of the Experts, states may violate the principle of due
diligence if domestic non-state actors conduct operations which result in serious adverse consequences and affect the rights of a target state. 165 The exact
threshold of “serious adverse consequence[]” is unsettled in international
law 166and poses a challenging issue in the arena of cyber hacking. The Experts agreed that cyber operations that result in a major impact to a state’s
economy, or one that severely disrupts government functions or business,
may be sufficient to trigger the rule. 167
The Experts were careful to specify, however, that the precept of due
diligence is only implicated when a non-state actor engages in an activity
that, if done by the territorial state, would breach an international legal obligation, such as violating sovereignty or would constitute intervention. 168
Thus, digital intelligence gathering by non-state actors may be a violation of

160. The International Court of Justice specifically included economic intervention in its list of
possible unlawful state actions. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 108, ¶ 205 (June 27).
161. Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 503. Other coercive goals could include destabilization of the
victim state’s economy or preventing the state from regulating its own economic affairs. Id. at 508–
09.
162. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(a)(4) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).
163. Objects may include government cyber infrastructure located onboard sea vessels, on foreign military installations, or in international airspace. See TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 33.
164. Id. at 30.
165. Id. at 35.
166. Id. at 36–37.
167. Id. at 38.
168. Id. at 36.
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domestic law, but in itself does not trigger the due diligence rule absent specific unlawful activity. Like state espionage, digital intrusions by non-state
actors only run afoul of international law when specific conduct violates
other international legal provisions. In that case, the territorial state has the
obligation to take feasible measures to end the offending cyber operation. 169
D. Right to Privacy
Customary international law also restricts states in terms of affirmative
human rights guarantees. 170 Importantly for this discussion, the Experts
opined that the status of economic rights is unclear as a matter of customary
law. 171 Instead, such rights are subject to the provisions of state treaty commitments. 172 The right to privacy, however, is more established. Cyber espionage activities may implicate the right to individual privacy, although espionage itself does not per se violate the rule. 173 The Experts agreed that the
right to privacy is one guaranteed by customary international law, but that its
scope is not well-defined. 174 The legality of examining the content of electronic communications, particularly, is complicated by whether such data
was inspected by humans or machines. 175 The Experts agreed that the collection of personal data of individuals did implicate this right—although they
were unable to agree on a definition of “personal data.” 176 Collection of
metadata may violate this rule if it is later linked to an individual and has a
nexus to that individual’s private life. 177 Notably, the right to privacy is not
absolute and may be subject to some limitations, including national security
justifications. 178
The Experts cautioned, however, that the application of this body of law
is significantly limited by territorial concerns.179 The majority agreed that
customary international human rights law applies to persons within a state’s
territory as well as within the physical territory where that state exercises
“power or effective control.” 180 The Experts could not reach a consensus on
whether state cyber activities could constitute such power or effective control
over territory or persons as opposed to physical power or control, triggering
the applicability of this customary rule—although the majority rejected this
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 43.
These rights include certain civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Id. at 187.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 189, 202–03.
Id. at 182–85.
Id. at 184.
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contention. 181 The majority believed that physical control over territory or
an individual person was necessary to trigger international human rights
laws. 182 In fact, the Experts noted a lack of evidence evincing an opinio juris
that state intelligence-gathering activities directed at persons on foreign territory triggered the international right to privacy. 183 In other words, the right
to privacy does not likely apply extraterritorially in most cases of international digital spying. This finding indicates that the current legal understanding may not effectively limit foreign cyber intelligence collection by states.
E. Honeypots
Another interesting cyber espionage issue raised by the Experts is that
of a “weaponized” honeypot. These devices may be used by states to deter
and punish foreign cyber espionage attempts. Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines a
honeypot as a deception technique to defend a computer system against malicious operations that use a physical or virtual environment designed to lure
the attention of intruders with the aim of deceiving the intruders about the
nature of the environment. 184 Honeypots can be created for the purpose of
wasting intruder resources, for gathering counter-intelligence information
about the intruder’s intent, and for identifying the individual’s means and
methods of cyber operations. 185 A weaponized honeypot is one that contains
files that, once exfiltrated, will cause significant disruption and damage to
the intruder’s own cyber system. 186 Again, the Experts were divided in terms
of how international law applies to this twist to cyber espionage. 187 A minority of Experts opined that the state that created the honeypot, at least, violated the sovereignty of the intruding state. Their theory was that the state
that created the honeypot set in motion the events and are, therefore, responsible under the law of state responsibility for an internationally wrongful
act. 188 The majority saw this issue rather differently. They believed that the
intruding state factually transmitted the weaponized files into their own cyber
infrastructure. As such, the state that created the honeypot and laid the trap
did not, in fact, conduct the actual activity that caused the harm. 189
In sum, although peacetime cyber espionage by states is not a per se
violation of international law, it is inextricably linked and intertwined with

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150–52.
Id.
Id.
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other internationally prohibited conduct. The legality of peacetime cyber espionage operations is dependent upon the specific conduct used to accomplish the act of espionage—in other words, whether specific activities associated with the espionage violate some norm of international law. The
unsettled limits of these provisions raise serious concerns about the current
state of the law.
F. Application in Times of Conflict
The Tallinn 2.0 legal framework for wartime cyber espionage differs
substantially from the preceding analysis. Rather than providing a possible
legal basis for declaring particular cyber espionage operation unlawful, it
closely tracks the existing law as applied to the status of spies during wartime. 190 In other words, the framework is primarily about the status of captured personnel, rather than the legality of state conduct. Because they are
grounded on geographic location and the spy’s return to their military as a
key trigger to immunity, the existing rules do not translate well to the digital
context. This Section will examine Tallinn 2.0’s cyber espionage rules in
wartime, noting the incongruities that render this law difficult to apply. The
gaps, ambiguities, and limitations of cyber espionage in the context of armed
conflict are largely a function of a discord between traditional notions of spying in warfare and the realities of cyber espionage.
The primary mismatch is the geographical limitation trigger for spying
under the law of armed conflict. For example, Hague Regulation Article 29
specifies that the spy must obtain or endeavor to obtain information “in the
zone of operations of a belligerent.” 191 Similarly, Article 46 of Additional
Protocol I uses somewhat comparable language: “[T]erritory controlled by
an adverse Party” to convey a similar idea. 192 Because the aim of the Experts
in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is to state the lex lata, Rule 89 appropriately incorporates the geographical limitation by specifying “who has engaged in cyber
espionage in enemy-controlled territory.” 193 The Experts were also careful
to note that cyber espionage performed from outside enemy territory does not
violate Rule 89. 194 The geographical limitation trigger for wartime cyber espionage is problematic and somewhat anachronistic when applied to cyber
espionage. One of the primary features and benefits of cyber operations generally, and cyber espionage specifically, is the ability to operate remotely. To
gather intelligence and other information, cyber spies can and do operate

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 409–12.
Hague IV, supra note 85, art. 29.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 46(2).
TALLINN 2.0, supra note 12, at 409.
Id. at 411.
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from virtually anywhere. Aside from speed and anonymity, having the ability to act remotely and achieve the same effects is one of the game-changing
advantages of using digital means.
Cyber capabilities may lessen the need to employ human resources on
the ground in conflict zones. One of the last places a cyber spy would want
to be is in enemy territory. The Experts acknowledged that given the geographical limitation to enemy-controlled territory, cyber spying would most
likely occur as a so-called “close access cyber operation,” which requires
physical proximity to the targeted system. 195 The example provided by the
Experts involved a member of the armed forces using a flash drive to access
a computer system or intercepting signals while acting clandestinely. 196 To
the extent that a spy is doing a close access cyber operation or intercepting
signals, the cyber aspect of the espionage mission is not particularly unique
or dispositive relative to other types of spying activities. Put in a slightly
different way, the close access operation is just another way of gathering intelligence, analogous to taking pictures, drawing maps, or stealing documents. It lacks some of the defining and most important characteristics of
the pertinent digital context.
A second, and related, mismatch involves the requirement that the act
of espionage must be carried out “clandestinely or under false pretences.” 197
To provide clarity to the meaning of the “clandestinely or under false pretences,” the Experts explained:
“Clandestinely” refers to activities undertaken secretly or secretively, as with a cyber espionage operation designed to conceal the
identity of the persons involved or the fact that it has occurred. An
act of cyber information collection is “under false pretences” when
conducted so as to create the impression that the individual concerned is entitled to access the information in question. 198
It is somewhat obvious that acting “clandestinely or under false pretences” in the real world is a rather different situation than in a virtual one.
This can be seen with three hypothetical situations. In the first hypothetical,
a combatant, operating behind enemy lines, takes off their uniform and dons
civilian clothing to facilitate sneaking into enemy headquarters with a flash
drive to steal plans from the enemy’s computer system. This hypothetical
represents a clear case of spying under the law of armed conflict. Upon capture, the combatant has lost their combatant immunity and POW status and
can be prosecuted under the domestic criminal law of the enemy state. In the
second hypothetical, the only difference is the combatant neither takes off
their uniform nor puts on civilian clothes. In this case, upon almost certain
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 410 (footnotes omitted).
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capture in the headquarters, the combatant is not a spy and retains combatant
immunity and POW status. In the third hypothetical, the combatant, while
operating behind enemy lines, continues to wear their uniform. The combatant is a computer specialist attempting to intercept enemy signals messages.
While online, they act anonymously to steal enemy passwords that give them
access to classified enemy communications. The combatant is captured by
the enemy while still wearing their uniform and before they rejoin their army.
The third hypothetical is somewhat problematic because, in the real
world, the combatant did not act “clandestinely or under false pretences.”
They continued to wear a uniform to distinguish themselves as a combatant.
In cyberspace, they absolutely acted secretly or secretively to conceal their
identity during this mission to intercept enemy signals. Moreover, by stealing the enemy’s passwords, they created the impression that they were entitled to access to the enemy’s network and information. Given those facts, is
the combatant now a spy subject to prosecution, even though, to the outside
world, they appeared to be a combatant for the duration of the operation?
Complicating the third hypothetical further is the concept of ruses under
the law of armed conflict. Ruses are acts intended to mislead an adversary
or to induce them to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of the law of
armed conflict. 199 Examples of ruses in armed conflict are “the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.” 200 Tallinn Manual
2.0, Rule 123, provides examples of permissible ruses in cyberspace, including using false computer identifiers, networks, and transmissions, as well as
enemy codes, signals, and passwords. 201 The third scenario represents an
important, but blurry, intersection between the rules regarding spying and
ruses. Given the facts in the third hypothetical, it is very difficult to conclude
such conduct would amount to spying under Rule 89.
A final issue that divided the Experts involved the nature of the information collected. The majority of the Experts believed that the nature of the
information collected has no bearing on the characterization of the activities
as cyber espionage. 202 The only stipulation was that it had to be collected on
behalf of a party to the international armed conflict. 203 Alternatively, the minority thought that the information involved must have some military
value. 204 This lack of consensus among the Experts further muddies the water of the legal parameters of espionage during wartime.
While reflecting on the lex lata of espionage, the Experts’ formulation
unfortunately does not effectively address several unique problems raised by
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 37(2).
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the realities of the digital environment. Particularly, Tallinn 2.0’s discussion
of wartime espionage is inapposite to the current developments, as it heavily
relies on the aforementioned “behind enemy lines” nexus. The next Part of
this Article considers these dynamics and proposes a path ahead for the lex
ferenda as states begin to substantively grapple with the current state of the
law.
V. THE ROAD AHEAD: THE LEX FERENDA
A. Political and Military-Based Cyber Espionage
Considerable ambiguity continues to exist regarding the legal limits of
cyber espionage, both in peacetime and during conflict, after Tallinn 2.0. Importantly, however, traditional methods of espionage have always existed in
a relative “black hole” of legality—domestically, but not internationally, proscribed and widely practiced. 205 The current legal framework for cyber espionage offers wide leeway and interpretive flexibility for states. In the absence of voluntary change in practice, international agreement, or emerging
legal custom, states will likely continue to comfortably operate within the
uncertain sphere of cyber espionage, conducting intelligence-gathering operations against foreign nations, institutions, and individuals. In particular, nations will continue foreign digital spying in order to gain military and political advantages, and to maintain national interests and security. This conduct
is strongly rooted in history, and nations continue to have powerful justifications for widespread intelligence collection in the modern day. 206
Indeed, there exist few intrinsic disincentives to cease these long-practiced activities. 207 In fact, cyber capabilities have somewhat mitigated the
risk for state-sponsored spies in terms of potential for capture. Further, attribution problems in cyber operations make it difficult for states to ensure
205. See supra Part II.
206. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Officials: Surveillance Programs Foiled More Than 50 Terrorist Plots, WASH. POST (June 18, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/officials-surveillance-programs-foiled-more-than-50-terrorist-plots/2013/06/18/d657cb56d83e-11e2-9df4-895344c13c30_story.html?utm_term=.8d1ad55a31c7 (discussing congressional
testimony by National Security Agency officials that the agency’s surveillance activities had
thwarted more than fifty incidents of terrorism).
207. Conversely, some scholars have theorized that states should have strong intrinsic interests
in solidifying the rules of state-sanctioned espionage even in security-related intelligence gathering,
apart from political pressures. Most convincingly, clear legal guidelines would facilitate intelligence sharing between allies where one state has been previously restricted in doing so by domestic
legal concerns over the second state’s surveillance activities. See Deeks, supra note 3, at 315–16
(noting particularly condemnation of surveillance practices carried out by the United States and the
United Kingdom). Additionally, states would benefit by tighter control of foreign surveillance over
their own citizens. Id. at 326. At least one head of state, for example, has expressed the view that
multiple practices involved in cyber intelligence gathering, such as foreign electronic surveillance,
violate international law. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 5th plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.5 (Sept.
24, 2013).
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foreign compliance with any future international agreements, reducing the
benefit of entering into arrangements that would limit their own intelligencegathering operations. 208 Additionally, states and corporations will continue
to be subject to malevolent cyber intrusions from private entities—both foreign and domestic—necessitating major investments in cyber security regardless of existing international agreements that limit state conduct. Therefore, despite major gaps and mismatches in the existing legal framework,
nations generally lack robust motivations to close them. Political influences,
however, including public opposition from citizens, humanitarian groups,
and foreign leaders may effectively curb some of the most concerning state
practices. 209
Internal and external political pressures can result in changes to domestic law and policy. So-called “naming and shaming” has been influential in
the modification of the U.S. government’s own surveillance policies, for example, after it faced enormous public backlash at home and abroad in the
wake of Edward Snowden’s disclosures. 210 Electronic surveillance practices
may be uniquely susceptible as the target of grassroots “naming and shaming” campaigns because they directly implicate the privacy of individuals. 211
Traditional methods of espionage, on the other hand, rarely reached far into
the private sphere. 212 Although the Experts stated that the international customary right to privacy was not effectively implicated due to the extraterritorial nature of foreign cyber espionage, states will likely be subject to considerable public pressure to limit these activities even in the absence of
applicable law on point. 213 Additional influences from corporations who risk
losing business due to state surveillance practices that infringe upon privacy
may also spur domestic change. 214
208. Indeed, the advent of cyber capabilities may exacerbate this long-standing source of state
reluctance to adopt espionage-limiting agreements. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
See generally William Banks, State Responsibility and Attribution of Cyber Intrusions after Tallinn
2.0, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1487 (2017) (discussing the critical role of cyber attribution in state responses
to cyber operations and the difficulties in establishing proper attribution).
209. Deeks, supra note 73, at 635–36.
210. See Sarah Childress, How the NSA Spying Programs Have Changed Since Snowden,
FRONTLINE (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-nsa-spying-programs-have-changed-since-snowden/ (chronicling the changing in surveillance policy resulting
from domestic and international backlash over the Snowden leaks). This event also prompted other
state governments to likewise re-examine their surveillance policies. Deeks, supra note 73, at 636
(citing David Omand, Understanding Digital Intelligence and the Norms that Might Govern It, in
GLOBAL COMM’N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, at 17 (Paper Ser. No. 8, 2015), https://ourinternetfiles.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/gcig_paper_no8.pdf).
211. See Deeks, supra note 3, at 319.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 297 (noting that democratic nations are more susceptible to public pressures in
this regard as compared to non-democratic and partly-democratic states, such as Russia and China).
214. Id. at 338–39 (stating that the profits of domestic technology firms may be undermined due
to reluctance by foreign entities to allow data to be stored within the United States where it will be
subject to surveillance).
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Concerning espionage conducted for the purposes of accessing foreign
state political and military secrets, then, country practices will ultimately be
limited by a combination of legal interpretation and policy objectives—themselves shaped by diplomatic concerns and internal political factors. These
same pressures may eventually persuade states to enter into multilateral
agreements restricting some offensive forms of cyber espionage by the major
world players—particularly those practices that most infringe on privacy—
but that possibility seems remote at the present time. 215 States may instead
agree to limit espionage in this realm with strategic partners, as these agreements may be in the best interests of states and tend to bolster collective national security frameworks. 216

215. See infra note 270 and accompanying text. Existing treaty laws do, to some extent, circumscribe some state surveillance activities. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”), for example, is a rights-based treaty which states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 17(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368. Most states are a party to this
treaty, including the United States and Russia. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION 2, 3, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2019). The article covers surveillance conducted within a state against persons within that state, whether citizen or not.
Considerable debate, however, surrounds the standard of state “arbitrariness” necessary to violate
this provision. The United States’ position is that the ICCPR does allow interference by states as
long as it is in accordance with transparent laws and for a legitimate state purpose. United States
Response to OHCHR Questionnaire on “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age,” UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/United%20states.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2019).
The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) disagrees, stipulating that the lawful state interference must be necessary, proportional, and accomplished according to well-tailored laws. See
Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56
HARV. INT’L L.J. 81, 133 (2015); see also Deeks, supra note 3, at 305–06. Such difference in
interpretation may result in disparate legal analyses on issues such as bulk intelligence gathering
against individuals. Deeks, supra note 3, at 306. Most problematically, there is little consensus
among scholars whether the ICCPR applies extraterritorially, thus limiting foreign surveillance activities. Id. at 306–07. The United States maintains that it does not apply extraterritorially. Id. at
307. The United Nations (“UN”) Human Rights Committee, charged with overseeing state compliance with ICCPR, made concluding observations regarding the United States, recommending that
the country take measures to ensure it was conforming to the covenant in its foreign surveillance
activities. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Rep. of the
United States, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014), https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/USA/CO/4. It is the UN’s position, then, that it does apply extraterritorially.
Short of a treaty amendment, this jurisdictional hurdle makes the ICCPR inadequate to address the
most pervasive and troubling, at least to states, forms of surveillance—those happening across international borders.
216. For example, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand—
the so-called “Five Eyes”—established a pact to refrain from spying on one another. See Margaret
Warner, An Exclusive Club: The Five Countries That Don’t Spy on Each Other, PBS (Oct. 25,
2013), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/an-exclusive-club-the-five-countries-that-dont-spyon-each-other.
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B. Espionage in Wartime
The object of much less public attention, rules regarding wartime espionage are unlikely to face political pressure of the nature described above.
Importantly, gaps in wartime cyber espionage discussed in the previous Part
do not seem to expose particularly pressing matters in the international legal
order. That is, although the rules are quite limited in application, and do not
fit well with the realities of most cyber operations, they do not pose especially
disturbing concerns for military leaders. Espionage in wartime is primarily
an issue of personnel status—whether a captured spy will receive formal
POW treatment and immunity from prosecution—rather than a restriction on
state conduct. In reality, the capture of an enemy cyber spy, whether territorially or extraterritorially, will likely be a remote possibility. Further, the
issue of personnel classification is relatively untroubling in most cases, as the
policy of many nations is to give “POW-like” status to all detainees, regardless of actual technical status. 217 Additionally, the rules regarding wartime
cyber spying, as in traditional wartime spying, are only applicable in international armed conflicts, not the more common non-international armed conflicts that primarily exist globally today. 218 As a result, it is unlikely that
states will advocate for adjusting this legal regime in the near future. It may
be possible that wartime cyber espionage will be addressed as part of a comprehensive legal agreement, should there be sufficient pressure to produce a
multilateral treaty addressing the many problems endemic to the application
of conventional laws of armed conflict to cyber warfare. 219 In the interim,
much like other law of war matters, one should expect that the legal framework will evolve in response to discrete issues as they arise.
C. The Unique Case of Cyber Economic Espionage
Economic and industry-based cyber espionage, on the other hand, have
emerged as a uniquely problematic practice on the international stage. For
many states, economic cyber espionage is unacceptably laden with risk, offers limited value, 220 and is less predictable and domestically controllable
217. See generally Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J.
367 (2004).
218. See, e.g., David Wallace et al., Trying to Make Sense of the Senseless: Classifying the Syrian War Under the Law of Armed Conflict, 25 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 555, 593 (2017) (classifying
the hostilities in Syria as primarily non-international armed conflicts); Nathalie Weizmann, Why
U.S. Being a Party to Armed Conflict in Afghanistan May Not End Soon, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 7,
2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/18904/u-s-forces-transition-drawdown-afghanistan/ (assuming
that at least one non-international armed conflict is occurring and will continue to occur in Afghanistan).
219. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 877
(2012) (discussing the desirability and proposed parameters of such a treaty).
220. Motivations to curb economic espionage, however, may ultimately be linked to the relative
risks versus rewards that the practice offers individual countries. See Goldsmith, supra note 51, at
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than traditional espionage for the purpose of national security. 221 Numerous
countries have begun to seek both domestic and international solutions to this
issue.
Worldwide, government officials have taken strong positions against
commercial spying. 222 Based on this emerging sentiment, states may agree
to distinguish traditional economic intelligence gathering from all other kinds
and regulate breaches through multilateral treaties.223 In practical terms, the
content of agreements and likelihood of compliance will be rooted in the relative interests, risks, and incentives facing individual states. 224 Based on this
assumption, it seems unlikely that the major players in international cyber
espionage, including the United States, United Kingdom, China, and Russia,
would unanimously agree to a comprehensive set of limitations. 225 One rather surprising development in this area, however, is the 2015 cyber agreement between the United States and China. In an effort to stem the tide of
pernicious cyber espionage, both governments agreed that neither would support nor conduct cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property. 226 China replicated these efforts with both Canada and the United Kingdom. 227 Given the

44–45 (noting that the United States has much to lose, but little to gain, in the field of economic
espionage). State governments with a strong nexus to domestic industry understandably stand to
benefit the most from these activities.
221. Most national governments do not have control over the cyber infrastructure used by domestic firms. Some, like the United States, have made recent attempts to strengthen ties to private
companies to ensure robust cyber security on these private networks. See generally Madeline Carr,
Public-Private Partnerships in National Cyber-Security Strategies, 92 INT’L AFF. 43 (2016).
222. See Ellen Nakashima, World’s Richest Nations Agree Hacking for Commercial Benefit Is
Off-Limits, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/worlds-richest-nations-agree-hacking-for-commercial-benefit-is-off-limits/2015/11/16/40bd0800-8ca9-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html.
223. See William C. Banks, Cyber Espionage and Electronic Surveillance: Beyond the Media
Coverage, 66 EMORY L.J. 513, 523 (2017).
224. Deeks, supra note 3, at 338–40.
225. Id. at 339–40.
226. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit
to the U.S. (Sept. 25, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states. According to the statement, “[N]either country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of
intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the
intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” Id. Ambiguity
exists as to the interpretation of this agreement’s terms. See Jack Goldsmith, Correction/Update:
China Did Accept the American Formulation in the Cyber Deal, LAWFARE (Sept. 27, 2015, 9:50
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/correctionupdate-china-did-accept-american-formulationcyber-deal.
227. See China, Canada Vow Not to Conduct Cyber Attacks on Private Sector, REUTERS (June
25, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-china-cyber/china-canada-vow-not-to-conduct-cyber-attacks-on-private-sector-idUSKBN19H06A; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UKChina Joint Statement on Building a Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century, GOV.UK (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-china-joint-statement2015; U.S.-China Cyber Deal Takes Norm Against Last Economic Espionage Global, COUNCIL ON
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magnitude and length of China’s pattern of cyber espionage abuses, however,
it is easy to be skeptical of these agreements. 228 Of note, diplomatic agreements such as these may not be legally binding. 229
One challenge in regulating economic cyber espionage is drawing clear
distinctions between permissible and impermissible conduct. 230 For example, collecting data regarding the private manufacture or flow of certain
goods that may be used by a state’s military, such as aircraft or satellites, may
be of both economic and national security consequence. Likewise, information about trade negotiations, a foreign state’s gold reserves, or plans to
alter prevailing interest rates are also of strategic significance.231 It would be
difficult to accurately define the parameters of acceptable data collection,
since commercial information commonly does have some nexus to national
security. Nations could agree that although economic data may be collected,
it must not be used to benefit or advantage domestic companies. For example, although the United States has consistently engaged in intelligence gathering with a nexus to the activities of foreign businesses, including investigating private industry corruption that impacts U.S. interests, it has also
consistently reaffirmed that the information is not shared with private corporations for their financial benefit.232 Compliance with a distinction like this
would understandably be complicated in states with strong ties between government and industry. Assuming that a line could be agreed upon and defined—by crafting limits based on the intent, purpose, or effect of economic
intelligence gathering, for example 233—there are numerous possible mechanisms for international legal codification and enforcement.

FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-china-cyber-deal-takes-norm-againsteconomic-espionage-global.
228. Fundamentally, it is unclear what benefit China would reap by complying with this agreement other than avoiding public international condemnation. See Jack Goldsmith, China and
Cybertheft: Did Action Follow Words?, LAWFARE (Mar. 18, 2016, 9:26 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/china-and-cybertheft-did-action-follow-words. Data does indicate a drop in Chinese
commercial theft after the adoption of this agreement. See David E. Sanger, Chinese Curb Cyberattacks on U.S. Interests, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/us/politics/china-us-cyber-spying.html?_r=0. But see Jack Goldsmith &
Robert D. Williams, The Chinese Hacking Indictments and the Frail “Norm” Against Commercial
Espionage, LAWFARE (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinese-hackingindictments-and-frail-norm-against-commercial-espionage (discussing the 2017 indictment of three
Chinese hackers under U.S. law for commercial espionage and possible links between the hackers
and the Chinese government).
229. See Goldsmith & Williams, supra note 228.
230. See Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 464–65 (discussing instances in which economic information of foreign powers would be useful to the maintenance of U.S. national security).
231. Id. at 464 (stating that these examples have traditionally been viewed as valid state uses of
surveillance).
232. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
233. See Jessica Malekos Smith, The Cyber Espionage Predominant Purpose Test, SMALL
WARS J. (Oct. 20, 2016), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-cyber-espionage-predominant-
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It may be feasible to adapt existing international legal frameworks and
forums for governing and adjudicating cyber espionage issues, such as
through the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
(“TRIPS”) 234 and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). 235 Parties to the
TRIPS Agreement must protect against the wrongful acquisition, disclosure,
or use of protected information, including proprietary trade secrets. 236 The
treaty does, however, allow for wide latitude on the part of states to create
exceptions to domestic implementing legislation for actions deemed essential
to the state’s own financial development, potentially allowing states to continue forms of economic espionage. 237 Also, as interpreted by many today,
TRIPS does not protect against economic espionage by foreign states. 238 If
amended to include instances of foreign economic espionage, cases could be
adjudicated through the WTO’s existing Dispute Settlement Body. 239 It is
also possible, though unlikely, that the WTO could adjudicate cases of economic espionage through other pertinent rules. 240
Other scholars suggest broadening the terms of the Cybercrime Convention to cover instances of international state-sponsored cyber espionage. 241
The Cybercrime Convention currently requires party states to enact domestic

purpose-test (proposing the adoption of a predominant purpose test to distinguish economic and
traditional espionage under international law).
234. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. See Banks, supra note 223, at 524; Scott J. Shackelford, The
Law of Cyber Peace, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 24–26 (2017).
235. The WTO has jurisdiction to hear disputes arising out of TRIPS. For an exploration of
possible ways that economic-based cyber espionage activities may be adjudicated by the WTO, see
Jamie Strawbridge, The Big Bluff: Obama, Cyber Economic Espionage, and the Threat of WTO
Litigation, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 833, 837 (2016). See also JAMES A. LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC
& INT’L STUDIES, CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION IN CYBERSPACE 49–51 (2013).
236. Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 491.
237. TRIPS, supra note 234, art. 8.
238. See Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 492; see also David P. Fidler, Economic Cyber Espionage
and International Law: Controversies Involving Government Acquisition of Trade Secrets Through
Cyber Technologies, ASIL INSIGHTS (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/10/economic-cyber-espionage-and-international-law-controversies-involving.
239. See Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 491. This body can authorize trade sanctions.
240. See Strawbridge, supra note 235, at 860. A victim state could allege a breach of good faith,
for example. Id. at 860–62. It may also be possible to invoke the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (“GATT”) against an offending state to substantiate trade restrictions. Id. at 862. The
likelihood of success for either of these approaches appears to be slim. Id. at 863. See also Fidler,
supra note 238.
241. Banks, supra note 223, at 524.
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legislation forbidding cyber theft. 242 The Agreement does not, however, effectively limit state-sanctioned espionage. 243 The Agreement also relies on
domestic definitions of cybercrimes and does not definitively proscribe economic espionage. 244 Amendments could be made to incorporate a duty to
criminalize the stealing of electronic information for the benefit of domestic
corporations. 245
Running parallel to the rise in international public disapproval of economic espionage, domestic prosecution efforts have also escalated. United
States federal laws proscribing espionage have been somewhat effective in
addressing instances of foreign espionage—although, the effects may be
more symbolic than practical. The Economic Espionage Act, 246 for example,
was enacted to specifically address foreign economic espionage. 247 The legislation applies to actions committed by individuals for the benefit of foreign
state powers and has been the basis of several indictments so far, including
those charging Chinese military hackers accused of commercial data theft
against U.S. corporations. 248 In 2014, five members of Unit 61398 were indicted and charged for hacking into the networks of Westinghouse Electric,
the United States Steel Corporation, and other companies. 249 Like other domestic laws potentially regulating international cyber behavior, the legislation’s impact is limited due to issues in determining attribution of the cyber
activities, ensuring extradition of defendants, and identifying proper judicial
forums for cases. 250 Indeed, the five Chinese hackers will likely never face
trial for their actions because of extradition problems. 251 Despite this fact,
242. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,174, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167. The
relevant articles provide that “[e]ach Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally,
the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.” Id. art. 2. However, states
are allowed wide berth in setting the parameters for such laws. Id. Article 3 of the Convention
similarly outlines provisions for the unlawful interception of data. Id. art. 3.
243. Banks, supra note 223, at 525. The terms of this Agreement are subject to a wide latitude
of state interpretation. For example, it does not clearly define the term “cybercrime.” Id.
244. Id.
245. See id.
246. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012).
247. 142 CONG. REC. 27111–12 (1996) (statement of Sen. Specter).
248. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber
Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage (May
19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor.
249. Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chineseworkers-with-cyberspying.html.
250. Shackelford, supra note 234, at 22 (noting other domestic laws on point that also suffer
from similar shortfalls, including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the National Stolen Property
Act, and the 2016 Defend Trade Secrets Act).
251. No extradition treaty exists between the United States and China. See Brendan Pierson &
Jonathan Stempel, Explainer: How Does Extradition to the U.S. Work?, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2018),
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the case was effective in sending a strong message of condemnation to the
Chinese government, as the incident played an important role in prompting
the bilateral cyber agreement with China.252 Further, public criminal prosecutions through domestic law may also play an important role in the development of international norms in the area of cyber espionage. 253
The effectiveness of domestic legislation ultimately hinges on logistical
considerations in bringing foreign actors to justice. Mutual legal assistance
and extradition treaties form the bedrock of international cooperation in prosecuting defendants outside national borders. 254 Some are fairly comprehensive in the range of crimes that trigger state duties to cooperate in foreign
prosecution of criminals and ostensibly include cyber-related incidents. 255
However, many lack meaningful enforcement obligations, as exemplified by
Russia’s refusal to extradite Edward Snowden despite a U.S.-Russia mutual
legal assistance treaty. 256 Some also lack specificity regarding cyber
crimes. 257 These agreements could be strengthened by providing sanctions
for states that do not comply with extradition guarantees and by amendments
that clearly outline state obligations in the cyber arena.
Given the significant jurisdictional issues with existing frameworks, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) may present a more effective, if piecemeal, approach to limit certain unwanted activities within state-sanctioned
cyber espionage. As noted above, domestic legislation—such as the Economic Espionage Act, which criminalizes foreign state theft of trade secrets—is, in reality, limited in its effectiveness due to difficulties in determining attribution, extraditing defendants, and finding proper forums for

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-huawei-tech-explainer/explainer-how-does-extradition-to-the-u-s-work-idUSKBN1O528Y. In 2018, a Chinese spy was extradited to the United States
for prosecution after he was lured to Belgium by American officials. See Ellen Nakashima, In a
First, a Chinese Spy Is Extradited to the U.S. After Stealing Technology Secrets, Justice Dept. Says,
WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinesespy-charged-with-stealing-us-military-secrets-and-extradited-for-prosecution/2018/10/10/b2a7325c-cc97-11e8-920f-dd52e1ae4570_story.html?utm_term=.f03969b038f2.
252. Shackelford, supra note 234, at 22.
253. See Ashley Deeks, Moving Forward on Cyber Norms, Domestically, LAWFARE (July 10,
2017, 1:10 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/moving-forward-cyber-norms-domestically.
254. The United States is a part of several such agreements. Shackelford, supra note 234, at 38.
255. Id. at 38–39.
256. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Russ., June 17, 1999, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 106-22 (2002). The treaty states that the parties agree to “provide to each other . . . comprehensive mutual legal assistance in criminal matters,” including “assistance provided by the Parties
in connection with: prevention, suppression, and investigation of crimes; criminal prosecutions; and
other proceedings related to such criminal matters.” Id. art. 1. The agreement lacks specific extradition provisions, however, for persons not already in custody. See id.
257. See Gail Kent, The Mutual Legal Assistance Problem Explained, CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y
(Feb. 23, 2015, 1:06 PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/02/mutual-legal-assistance-problem-explained.
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adjudication. 258 BITs may be more efficient tools for dealing with these criminal activities. Such agreements would provide victim businesses with a legal
avenue to pursue remedies against foreign states directly and a forum to do
so. 259 These instruments would also fix another endemic problem in frameworks of domestic prosecution: harmonizing the applicable substantive
law. 260
Based on the serious risks posed by modern industrial cyber espionage,
and a lack of governing international law framework, many states have enacted internal legislation to mitigate threats to their own government and domestic industries. Some have passed data localization laws ensuring domestic control over cyber infrastructure. Kazakhstan, for example, requires new
businesses to use internet servers physically located within the country. 261
Taiwanese law allows government authorities to restrict international transfers of data based on national interests. 262 Others have adopted policies regarding computer hardware or software. In 2017, for example, President
Trump signed a law purging Kaspersky antivirus software from U.S. government computers over a concern of cyber espionage. 263 These developments
display the utility of state efforts to act protectively within their own borders
in the absence of applicable comprehensive international legal framework
providing remedies for security breaches.
Finally, as states continue to make efforts to eradicate economic espionage, this could lead to the development of customary international law. The
formation of customary law in this area, in fact, seems more probable than a
consensus by the major world powers on a multilateral legal agreement. 264
As defined by the International Court of Justice, customary law requires that
states generally and uniformly follow a certain practice, and those states believe that the practice is required by international law (also referred to as
opinio juris). 265 Unlike traditional forms of espionage which rarely resulted
in states publicly rebuking foreign governments—instead, quietly expelling
or prosecuting the spy involved—modern cases involving economic espionage show the opposite trend. 266 Current events indicate that states are becoming more willing to draw a distinction between economic and other forms
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Shackelford, supra note 234, at 22.
Id. at 23 (identifying the benefits of these agreements to include recourse to arbitration).
See id.
Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 682 (2015).
Id.
Dustin Volz, Trump Signs into Law U.S. Government Ban on Kaspersky Lab Software,
REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-kaspersky/trump-signsinto-law-u-s-government-ban-on-kaspersky-lab-software-idUSKBN1E62V4.
264. Deeks, supra note 3, at 342.
265. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1b, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
266. Complicating this pattern of public condemnation, however, are statements made by public
officials which indicate that the state practice of refraining from economic sabotage is ultimately
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of espionage. 267 In addition to the multiple bilateral agreements involving
China, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada, G-20 268 leaders
agreed in 2015 to refrain from conducting espionage for financial benefit. 269
This general trend toward international consensus is not without exception,
however. In June 2017, after years of making progress toward the establishment of comprehensive cyber norms, discussions at the United Nations ended
in deadlock. 270 Despite this recent setback, an international custom may
emerge as states continue to affirm individual commitments to refrain from
economic espionage and those commitments are solidified into legally-binding agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
The nature of espionage to date generally required a person to place
themselves at risk by physically traveling into a hostile country—in peacetime or wartime—to obtain the information being sought. Because states
were able to substantively prohibit espionage within their sovereign borders
or within their zone of military operations, they could meaningfully police
activities within their jurisdiction yet continue to engage in espionage operations abroad. Cyber espionage fundamentally altered this equation and upended the accompanying risk analysis. No longer does a spy have to cross
into hostile territory to obtain the desired information—it can be done from
the comfort of a desk with a computer workstation. Moreover, states have
rooted in domestic concerns about fairness, rather than a duty to the international community. For
example, a common justification for the United States’ position against the sharing of business secrets with private industry is that it would unfairly preference those selected businesses over others
who are not recipients of the state-gathered intelligence. See Rascoff, supra note 47, at 259. Secondarily, the position is also justified as an effort to strengthen attempts at prosecuting foreign defendants under domestic economic espionage legislation, such as the Economic Espionage Act,
which may otherwise be undermined by similar state practice. Id. at 260. Interestingly, however,
this second justification seems undermined by espionage for the purpose of national security, in
which foreign agents have long been prosecuted. Id.
267. See Lotrionte, supra note 4, at 489 (discussing the significance of the United States’ public
condemnation and criminal prosecution of Chinese military officials).
268. The G20 is comprised of nineteen countries and the European Union—representing the
world’s largest economies. See What Is the G20 Summit?, G20 2019 JAPAN, https://g20.org/en/summit/about/#participants (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
269. See Nakashima, supra note 222. Leaders of the G-20 promised that “no country should
conduct or support [cyber]-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other
confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies
or commercial sectors.” Id. (alteration in original).
270. See Owen Bowcott, Dispute Along Cold War Lines Led to Collapse of UN Cyberwarfare
Talks, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/23/uncyberwarfare-negotiations-collapsed-in-june-it-emerges; see also Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, JUST
SECURITY (June 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/ (positing that Cuba, Russia, and China were outliers in
state consensus).
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lost much direct control over espionage targeting domestic industry, as the
data and digital infrastructure is privately owned and cyber intrusion requires
neither a government entry visa nor diplomatic papers. Meanwhile, the effects of intellectual property and proprietary theft on private corporations is
felt quite strongly at the national level and poses a distinct threat of national
economic harm. The current international law framework for espionage,
however, is ultimately rooted in traditional methods of spying—developed in
the absence of this unique digital environment.
Tallinn 2.0 has accomplished a great deal to assist states in dealing with
the issue of cyber espionage. By comprehensively documenting the lex lata,
the Experts have made it possible to focus on the developments of cyber espionage in relation to the current international law framework and expose its
ensuing flaws. The process of international law development via customary
law and treaty can be interminably slow, and developments in technology
generally outpace the development of international law. As the Tallinn 2.0
framework is substantially based on traditional rules regarding espionage,
there understandably exist many areas of uncertainty. The legal thresholds
and parameters regarding the violation of sovereignty and intervention, for
example, remain particularly unclear. The limits of the state duty of due diligence in preventing actions of non-state actors also seem opaque. Ambiguity still exists as to the applicability of the right to privacy and the extent to
which it may restrict state cyber spying. Most obviously, the rules as applied
to wartime seem to be especially unhelpful and inapplicable, as they are tied
to espionage taking place within the geographic territory of the victim state.
Despite these uncertainties in the lex lata, most states are unlikely to
insist on more concrete guidelines within the field of cyber spying for political and military secrets. Espionage itself has traditionally existed in a nebulous legal status, and nations have comfortably operated within this sphere
both in peacetime and during conflict. Advances in digital technology have
no doubt altered the playing field of state-on-state espionage, but nations still
lack strong incentives to curb most cyber intelligence gathering through legally binding agreements. While governments, institutions, and individuals
may have to resign themselves to the continuing ubiquity of cyber spying for
national security and military purposes, the tide may be turning in the specific
case of economic espionage. Economic espionage poses a particularly riskladen and unmanageable threat to states, and world leaders have increasingly
publicized their opposition to the practice. States, in fact, face a multitude of
options to meaningfully limit incidents of economic-based espionage in the
future.

